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Nikolas A. Apostolou
The Electoral College's Fragile Relationship with the American Public
t2lU20r8
"A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will
be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated
investigations. It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult
and disorder. This evil was not least to be dreaded in the election of a magistrate, who was to
have so important an agency in the administration of the government as the President of the
United State. But the precautions which have been so happily concerted in the system under
consideration, promise an effectual security against mischief."
This passage from Alexander Hamilton's Federalist Papers No 68, well represents our
founding fathers' beliefs and fears around electing a president. In the writing, Hamilton argues
for the implementation of the Electoral College system. Primarily the Electoral College was
favored by the founders, and ultimately it was implemented for two reason.
First, an uneducated, unsophisticated, and easily manipulated citizenry was concerning
for the founders. They believed that the Electoral College would ensure that the chosen electors
fulfill their duties of choosing a qualified candidate for the office of president. These electors
would act as a check on an electorate that might be duped by a candidate. The group of electors
only met once ever, thus making it all but impossible for a foreign government to manipulate
them over time. This certainty was key in the electoral process for Hamilton and the founders.
In the Federalist Papers No 68, Hamilton says "The process of election affords a moral
certainty, that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an
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eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications". Thus, the first reason the Electoral
College was created as a result ofthe founders not trusting the population to make the right
choice.
Second, the Electoral College was created because it acts as part ofa compromise made
to satis$ small states and as a protection of state powerr. Under the Electoral College system
each state had the same number ofelectoral votes as they had representation in Congress.
Individual states would send electors who would presumably prevent the election of a candidate
threatening to centralize power in the federal govemment. It sought to reconcile differing state
and federal interest, provide a degree ofpopular participation in the election, give the less
populous states some additional leverage in the process by providing "senatorial" electors,
preserve the presidency as independent ofCongress, and generally insulate the election process
from political manipulation. For these reasons and more, the Electoral College was the safe
guard implemented by the founding fathers to protect the American electoral process for the
offices of President and Vice-President.
Although ratified as a part of the Constitution at the Constitutional Convention of 1787,
many ofthe original justifications for the Electoral College have less force today. Amendments
to the Constitution such as the 17th Amendment, and the rapid growth of informational sources
available to the populace at large, has generally silenced the original concerns that lead to the
Electoral College. A 201 1 Gallup Poll reported 62 percent of Americans would forgo the
Electoral College in favor ofa "one person, one vote" election process (Saad 2011)2. With that
I See Elizabeth D. Lauzon, (2007) Challenges to Presidential Electoral College and Electors
20 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 183 (Originally published in 2007)
2 Lydia Saad, Americans Would Swap Elecloral College For Popular Vote
(lerys=Ce!!p-sa!s 2011) "Nearly I I years after the 200 presidential election brought the
idiosyncrasies of the United States' Electoral College into full view, 620/o of Americans say they
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said, changing this system of electing the President and Vice-President would be extremely
challenging because it would take a constitutional amendment ratified by 314 of the states. But
while a majority of Americans would willingly rid the system of the Electoral College as an
outdated relic of years past, it is not a topic that is as fiercely contested.
There are a number of political and cultural topics in America that evoke hostile
emotional responses, but the Electoral College is not one of them. Even though a majority of
Americans are in favor of doing away with the Electoral College, it is a societal norm. The
strength of the Electoral College is that the American people know nothing else. The Electoral
College is thus an example of an idea that fits well into the theory of Legal Positivism.
Legal Positivism
Legal Positivism is the thesis that the existence and content of law depends on social
facts and not on the merits. The English jurist John Austin famously formulated it as: "The
existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another. Whether it be or be not is one
enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry."
(1832, p. 157)3. This is not to say that a laws merits are unimportant, rather, that the merits do
not determine whether specific laws or a system of law exist.
Whether a society has a legal system is dependent on the values and structure of the
governance of a society. The governance of a society is based on the society's social customs.
Laws are in force when a societies officials recognize certain social standards as authoritative,
such as legislative enactments, judicial decisions, or social customs. For H.L.A. Hart, the
would amend the U.S. Constitution to replace that system for electing presidents with a popular
vote system. Barely a third, 35o/o, say they would keep the Electoral College".
3 See John Austin (1832). The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. Ed. E.E. Rumble, 1995.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5
authority of law is sociala. The ultimate criterion ofvalidity in a legal system is neither a legal
norn nor a presupposed norm, but a social rule that exists only because it is actually practiced
(1994, p. 116)5. Every four years the American voters practice utilizing the Electoral College
when voting for the office of President and Vice-President. Acts as basic as voting, as well as
additional example to follow, will support that legal positivism is today, keeping the Electoral
College alive and strong.
62 percent of American's believed that the Electoral College was not needed in 2011, yet
the system continues on strong today. In part, legal positivism can be pointed to for this.
American officials have long recognized certain social standards as authoritative. Some ofthe
most basic and influential examples can be seen in the American legal system and the decisions
that they make. The Constitution of the United States is possibly the most well recognized
authoritative standard. More subtly, social custom plays a role in the Electoral College, and how
the future leaders in America will handle decisions dealing with the Electoral College.
The American legal system as a whole has given great significance and legitimacy to the
Electoral College system. According to positivism, law is a matter of what has been posited,
ordered, decided, practiced, or tolerated. The Constitution of the United States of America did
just that, it enshrined the idea of the Electoral College for future generations to model and
practice.
a See H.L.A. Hart, (1994, first edition 196l) The Concept of Law,Znd ed. ed.P. Bullock
5 Hart's necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence ofa legal system are that "those
rules of behavior which are valid according to the system's ultimate criteria of validity must be
generally obeyed, and ...its rules ofrecognition specilying the criteria oflegal validity and its
rules ofchange and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of
official behavior by its officials".
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The United States Constitution Article II, Section I lays out the framework for the
Electoral College. Section 1, Clause 2 speaks to the process for the appointment ofelectors. The
only restriction put upon the states by the Constitution was that no person holding an office ol
trust or profit under the United States shall be appointed an elector. Section l, Clause 3 speaks to
the timing of the election process. It gives Congress the power to decide when electors are
chosen and when they vote. Since the ratification ofthe Constitution, there have been two
amendments to the Constitution that has affected the Electoral College6.
First, the 12th Amendment was ratified in 1 804 because there had been considerable
confusion during the 1800 election process which needed clarification. The amendment provided
for the election ofthe president and vice president by the electoral college. Should there be no
majority vote for one person, the house of Representatives, with one vote per state, chooses the
president and the Senate then chooses the vice president. Finally, there was the 23rd Amendment
to the Constitution which included the Electoral College. In the year l96l the U.S. Constitution
was ratified allowing District of Columbia residents to vote in presidential electionsT. The
District is entitled as if it were a State, but in no event may they have more electors than the least
populous State.
The ratification of the U.S. Constitution, as well as the 12th and 23rd Amendments
proved the intent ofthe founding fathers and generations that followed them. Law is a matter of
6 See National Archives and Records Administration: America's Founding Documents
(archives.sov)
7 While many of the people leading the push were liberal Democrats, the District of Columbia in
the 1950's was fairly balanced in its potential voting impact. Thus, an amendment to grant the
District increased voting powers was able to gain bipartisan support in a way that would have
been more difficult later.
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what has been posited, ordered, decided, practiced, or tolerated. Clearly, this set of laws has been
posited and ordered. Moving forward, looking at the court system, one will see that American
courts have decided, practiced, and tolerated that Electoral College many times over8.
The Supreme Court held in Sanders v. Gray.372 U.S. 386, 83. S. Ct. 801,9 L. Ed. 2d
821 (1963), that the inclusion ofElectoral College in the federal Constitution under U.S. Const.
Art. II, $ I and U.S. Const. Amend XII, does not violate the 14th Amendment's equal protection
and due process clauses, despite its inherent numerical inequality in presidential elections. The
Court pointed out that under the Electoral College, in election ofthe President and Vice-
President, voting strength is not in exact proportion to population. However, since the Electoral
College was set up as a compromise to enable the formation of the Union among several
sovereign states, such voting inequalities does not violate the 14th Amendment.
In Trinse:t v. U.5..2000 WL 1871697 (E.D. Pa. 2000), the court held that the Electoral
College, as implemented under U.S. Const. Art. II, g 1 and U.S. Const. Amend. XII, does not
unconstitutionally deny voters their right to a one person, one vote equality as protected under
the l4th Amendment (Lauzon 1007)e. The court noted that neither the Constitution nor the one
person, one vote doctrine vests a right in the citizens ofthe country to vote for presidential
electors or empowers the courts to ovemrle a constitutionally mandated procedure in the event
that the vote ofthe electors is contrary to the popular vote.
8 See Elizabeth D. Lauzon, (2007) Challenges to Presidential Electoral College and Electors
20 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 183 (Originally published in 2007)
e The court inTrinsey stated that under the 14th Amendment, once the state has granted its
citizens the right to vote for presidential electors, the state may not, by later arbitrary and
disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another. The court also noted that it did
not have the province to engage in a constitutional amendment where it is asserted that part of
the document is unconstitutional.
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Finally, the most recent of the cases, New v. Ashcroft.293 F. Supp. 2d256,20 A.L.R.
Fed,.2d,733 (E.D. N.Y. 2003). In that decision, the court stated that its role is to interpret and
enforce the Constitution, and that it is not empowered to strike the document's text on the basis
that it is offensive to itself or is in some way intemally inconsistent.
Essentially, the courts around America have told the public one thing in regard to the
Electoral College. That is that it cannot be questioned constitutionally, as it was established by
the Constitutionror r. This reasoning brings us back to the quote earlier from John Austin, "The
existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another". Throughout the American.justice
system and its challenges of the Electoral College, the courts answer has been that the laws exist,
and they speak not to its merit or demerit. For positivists, this offers a theory ofvalidity to such a
law.
There are two main categories to the term validity. First, Han Kelsen says that validity is
the specific mode ofexistence ofa norm. For example, an invalid marriage is not a special kind
of marriage having the property of invalidity; it is not a marriage at all. In this light, a valid law
is one that is systematically valid in the jurisdiction (1945, p. 6l)r2. The second main idea of
t0 See Penton v. Humphrey, 264 F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Miss. 1967). There the court noted that the
one-person, one-vote doctrine has been applied to an increasing number ofvoter processes, but
the alleged inequities of the Electoral College, established under U.S. Const. Art II, g I and U.S.
Const. Amend. XII, are an exception to the application ofthe doctrine because the Electoral
College is created by the Constitution.
rrAlso See lrishv. Demouatic-Farmer-Labor Port of Minn.,399F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968). The
court noted that the use of the Electoral College is a variation from the one man-one vote
criterion ofequal protection. However, since the Constitution created the inequity in the
Electoral College, it could not be held unconstitutional under the l4th Amendment.
12 See: Hans Kelsen ( 1945). "General Theory of Law and State". trans. A. Wedberg, repr. 1961.
New York: Russell and Russell.
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validity is one of moral propriety, which is the sound justification for respecting the norm. The
moral propriety ofa law rests on its merits. One indication that these senses differ is that one
may know that a society has a legal system, and know what its law are, without having any idea
whether they are morally justifiedr3.
Therefore, validity is a major factor when looking to the decision-making process for the
American court system. Based on the unwavering validity of the U.S. Constitution and based on
the sound justifications that were originally given by the founders for the Electoral College,
courts around America have without question held on behalfofthe Electoral College, and there
is no sense ofthat changing anfime soon. And even if it is not the case with the Electoral
College, the argument can be made that a seemingly immoral law will get a pass under a
positivist thesis that deemphasizes the importance of morality.
To be clear, there are no legal positivists arguing that the systemic validity of law
establishes its moral validity. Kelsen states that "The science of law does not prescribe that one
ought to obey the commands of the creator of the constitution" (1967 , p. 2040)11 . Hart believes
only a prima facie duty to obey, based on and limited by faimess. One owes no obligation to
unfair or pointless laws (Hart 1995). To accuse Hart and other positivists of believing that laws
should be obeyed regardless ofcontent is baseless. Hart explains that "an enormous
overvaluation of the importance of the bare fact that a rule may be said to be a valid rule of law,
13 In this sense a valid law is one that is systemically valid in the jurisdiction, this is distinct from
the idea of validity as a morally sound justification for respecting the norm.
1a See: Hans Kelsen (1967). "Pure Theory of Law", trans. M. Knight. Berkeley: University of
Califomia Press.
10
as ifthis, once declared, was conclusive ofthe final moral question: 'Ought this law to be
obeyed'?" (Hart 1958, p. 75)t5.
Hart had seminal views on the concepts of positivism and legal systems in his work lie
Concept of Law. While every legal system in the world contains primary rules that regulate
behavior, Hart believed that legal systems with only those primary rules were not as
sophisticated as others. The emphasis on primary rules to regulate behavior has led to the
overlooking ofa second type ofrule, another primary rule which confers upon citizens the power
to create, modify, and extinguish rights and obligations in the other persons. These rules
empower persons to structue their legal relations within the coercive framework of the law, a
feature that Hart regards as one of "law's greatest contributions to social life". But there is one
truly distinguishing factor when it comes to the differences between rudimentary forms of law,
and a true legal system. That difference for Hart comes in the existence of secondary meta rules.
Secondary meta rules are specific to the ways in which primary rules maybe be conclusively
ascertained, introduced, eliminated, and varied (Hart 1994, p. 92)16.
Hart distinguishes three types ofsecondary rules that mark a societal change from
primitive forms of law to a true legal system. (1) The rule of recognition which "specifies some
feature of features or features possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive
affirmative indication that it is a rule ofthe group to be supported by the social pressure it exerts"
f s For other, similar, examples see Joseph Raz, "The Morality of Freeclom" Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
16 [Secondary rules] "may be said to be on a diflerent level lrom the primary rules, for they are
all about such rules; in the sense that while primary rules are concemed with the actions that
individuals must or must not do, these secondary rules are all concemed with the primary rules
themselves. They specify the way in which the primary rules may be conclusively determined"
(Hart 1994, p. 92).
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(Hert 1994, p. 92), (2) the rule of change, which enables a society to add, remove, and modify
valid rules; and (3) the rule of adjudication, which provides a mechanism for determining
whether a valid rule has been violated. To use Hart's own words, law is "the union of primary
and secondary rules" (Hart 1994, p. 107). This means all societies with true legal systems have a
rule ofrecognition that articulates criteria for legal validity, and it include provisions lor making,
changing, and adjudicating laws. Thus, under a positivist theory it is absotutely possible to
change laws that are valid as a societal norm yet morally invalid. The next question becomes,
what makes a law morally invalid, and ifthe Electoral College fits within those categories.
Natural law theorists accept that unjust laws may have legal validity. As John Finnis says
in his work Natural Law and Natural Rights, "The tradition goes so far as to say that there may
be an obligation to conform to some such laws in order to uphold respect fbr the legal system as
a whole". Finnis goes on to lay out a number oftypes ofunjust laws. First, are laws promulgated
by leaders not intended to advance the common good. For example, laws intended to benefit the
leaders, or their friends or laws made out of malice against some person or group (Finnis p. 352).
Second, laws that constitute ultra vires acts are an abuse ofpower and another type olinjustice in
law. An ultra vires act is one in which an office-holder may exploit their opportunity to affect
people's conduct by making stipulations which stray beyond their authority. Thirdly, laws
promulgated without following proper procedure are unjustrT. According to Finnis it is an
important aspect of commutative justice to treat all people as entitled to the dignity of setf-
direction and they equal opportunity of understanding and complying with the law. Finally, a law
17 
"The exercise of legal authority otherwise than in accordance w'ith due requirements of manner
and form is an abuse and an injustice, unless those involved consent, or ought to consent to an
accelerated procedure in order to cut out'red tape' which in the circumstances would prejudice
substantial justice" (Finnis p 3 53)
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can be unjust even if it occurs unintentionally. For example, by imposing on some a burden from
which others are exempt, it may be commutatively unjust. By denying to one, some, or everyone
an absolute human right that is consistent with the reasonable requirements ofpublic order, it
may be commutatively unjust. A legal injustice of these magnitudes will affect the obligations
owed by individuals according to Finnis.
How do injustices of law affect the obligations ofindividuals to obey that law? Finnis
breaks down the phrase "obligation to obey the law" as having four possible meanings.
Empirical liability, legal obligation, moral obligation, and a collateral moral obligation, are the
possible interpretations of the phrasel8 (Finnis p. 354). The first of the four interpretations,
empirical liability, Finnis claims to be asked most often theoretically. As he states, "Ifone asks
how injustice affects one's obligation to conform to law, one is not likely to be asking for
information on the practically important but theoretically banal point oflfact, 'Am I or am I not
likely to be hanged for non-compliance with this law?"'(Finnis p. 355). The second possible
interpretation, a legal obligation in a legal sense, sounds redundant but is not. Finnish explains
that legal thought allows for the principles ofpractical reasonableness and not solely from some
past acts or court decisions. For example, there are regularly arguments before the highest courts
that look to amend or abandon well established rules and doctrines. Although, once a law is ruled
r8 
"...Someone uttering the question might conceivably mean by 'obligation to obey the law
either: (i) empirical liability to be subjected to sanction in event of non-compliance; or (ii) legal
obligation in the intra-systemic sense ('legal obligation in the legal sense') in which the practical
premise that conformity to law is socially necessary is a framework principle insulated from the
rest of practical reasoning; or (iii) legal obligation in the moral sense (i.e. the moral obligation
that presumptively is entailed by legal obligation in the intra-systemic or legal sense); or (iv)
moral obligation deriving not from the legality of the stipulation-of-obligation but from some
'collateral' source..." (Finnis p. 354)
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upon, and is said to be just or unjust but remaining a law, it is not wise to continue with the
argument. There is no practical purpose to attack the positivity of a law in that manner. Finnis's
third interpretation of the question, moral obligations, will be very different from the second in
how strongly it is argued in that sense.
"Given that legal obligation presumptively entails a moral obligation, and that the legal
system is by and large just, does a particular unjust law impose upon me any moral obligation to
conform to it?" (Finnis p. 357). Finnis argues that rulers have, strictly speaking, no right to be
obeyed, but do have the authority to make morally obligatory rules. This authority is lor a
specific purpose though, for the common good. Therefore, ifrulers chose to use their authority in
the detriment of the common good, or against basic principle ofpractical reasonableness, any
such rule lacks the authority the rest oftheir rules holdle. Specifically, Finnis says, "For the
purpose ofassessing one's legal obligations in the moral sense, one is entitled to discount laws
that are'unjust in any ofthe way mentioned'"2o (p. 360). Finally, the fourth interpretation is
connected to the third. Finnis explains that the effectiveness ofother laws can be harmed by the
sight ofother citizens disobeying or disregarding a specific law. Thus, in this situation the good
does not derived from being a law-abiding citizen, rather the good hinges on an individual not
negatively effecting the legitimately just laws. Therefore, Finnis comes to the conclusion that the
le 
"More precisely, stipulations made for partisan advantage, or (without emergency
justification) in excess oflegally defined authority, or imposing inequitable burdens on their
subjects, or directing the doing ofthings that should never be done, simply fail, of themselves, to
create any moral obligation whatever" (Finnis p. 360).
20 
'Unjust in any of the ways mentioned' is in reference to (XII.2 Types oflnjustice in Law p.
3s2)
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good citizen may, but not always, be morally required to conform to certain stipulations in order
to keep law effective.
Now with a grounded understanding ofwhat makes law valid or invalid, just or unjust,
moral or amoral, and our obligations pertaining to those rules, it is time to look into the moral
and legal implications of the Electoral College, both intended and unintended consequences.
From there, we can conclude if the Electoral College is unj ust or not.
Morality Issues of the Electoral College
John Finnis explains three types ofinjustices in the law. First, are laws promulgated by
leaders not intended to advance the corrmon good. For example, laws intended to benefit the
leaders, or their friends or laws made out of malice against some person or group (Finnis p. 352).
The intent ofthe founding fathers was not maiicious in their actions to create the Electoral
College, but they certainly made the law to devalue specific citizens. Hamilton and the other
founders believed that the electors would be able to ensure that only a legitimately qualified
candidate would be selected president. They believed that the electoral college was a safety net
to guard that public from being deceived. And they believed that the electors would be "free
from any sinister bias"2l. Looking at these reasons today, it appears that they are no longer
relevant.
Technology in 2018 allows all perspective voters to gather the necessary information to
make informed decisions in the blink on an eye. This was not something the lbunders could have
ever envisioned. Using electors was intended to safeguard against uninformed or uneducated
decisions in a country far too large to communicate effrciently at the time. This is no longer a
21 See The Federolisl 68
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concern, or a legitimate reason to continue on with the system today. In addition, the electors of
today are most likely not the ones "free from any sinister bias" that Hamilton wrote about22. The
members of the Electoral College are today chosen by the political parties and are expected to
vote along party lines.
InSbarboro v. Jordan, 164 Cal.51,127 P. 170 (1912), the court held that the presidential
electors nominated by a regularly called and organized convention of a political party were
entitled to have the Secretary of State place their names on the general election ticket232a.
Moving forward, American courts have not only found those electors nominated as entitled to
have their names on the ballot, but that they must go through party conventions. In King v.
Willis,333 F. Supp. 670 (D. Del. l97l), the court held that the state's requirements that a
political party hold state and nation conventions to nominate presidential electors and to form a
state committee, did not constitute unreasonable burdens upon the presidential candidate's First
and 14th Amendment rights. Not only has the court system mandated the political convention
process for selecting electors, but in certain cases they have also upheld cases in which parties
mandate who the electors vote for.
In Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214,72 S. Ct. 654,96 L. Ed. 894 (1952), the Courr held that the
constitutional provisions goveming presidential elections did not bar the political party from
requiring a pledge from presidential elector candidates in its primary to support nominees of its
22 See Also: William C. Kimberling, "The Manner of Choosing Electors," uselectionatlas.org
23 See Elizabeth D.Lauzon, (2007) Challenges to Presidential Electoral College and Electors
20 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 183 (Originally published in 2007)
2a See Also: Spreckels v. Graham. 194 Cal. 516,228 P. 1040 (1924) the court held that the
nomination of presidential electors could be made only at party conventions, to which delegates
were chosen at the primaries, or by nominations at the primaries in the case of new or small
parties, thus shutting out independent nominations all together.
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national convention. This does not seem to be the system that the founders envisioned when
implementing the Electoral College. But as the system has changed and grew over time, the
Electoral College seems to be the one stalwart that hasn't changed.
As referenced earlier, several voting rights have been constitutionally amended over time.
Be it women gaining the right to vote, freed slaves gaining the same right, the shift from an
appointed to a popularly elected Senators, or the fact that the Vice-Presidency was at one time
handed to the looser of the general election, the system has changed. Seemingly most analogous
to the Electoral College is the shift in Senators be appointed by state legislatures to a popular
vote which took a constitutional amendment to become law. In light of the structure of the
Electoral College, the same process would need to be followed. While a partisan and gridlocked
political system would likely never move to see this happen, there is at least a process in which
the results can be replicated.
As Finnis has stated, a law can be unjust even if it occurs unintentionally. The founding
fathers might not have intentionally caused unjust consequences, but it seems clear that The
Electoral College gives too much power to so called "swing states", essentially allowing
presidential elections to be battled out solely in a handful of states. During the 2016 national
election, the presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump made more than 90%o of
their campaign stops in just eleven battleground states2s. Of those visits, nearly two-thirds took
place in the four battleground states with the most electoral votes, that includes Florida,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and North Carolina26. The two main political parties can nearly guarantee
2s See: Sam Weber and Laura Fong, "This System Calls for Popular Vote to Determine
Winner", pbs.org Nov. 6, 2016
26 See: 2TOtowin.com "States Voting History"
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winning the electoral votes in certain states, such as Califomia for the Democratic Party and
Indiana for the Republican Partyztzt. The Electoral College is not worried about actual popular
vote totals, neither are candidates. They only need to pay attention to a small number olstates
that can swing in either direction. This point is given credence by the wildly unbalanced nature
ofthe 2016 presidential candidates campaigning trails.
Another unintended consequence ofthe Electoral college is the so called "swing state
privilege2e3o. There are millions ofvoters in safe states across the country that feel as though
their votes are wasted. Specifically, in presidential races this is a concem. For example, for
democratic voters in Califomia it doesn't matter if their nominee wins by ten million votes, or ten
votes, they still eam the same 55 electoral votes. There is seemingly little incentive for voters to
tum out for presidential elections ifthey live in a state where their political party has a
significant advantage. In part due to the winner take all system implied in most states, this
feeling of a wasted vote is magnified even more when looked at in the minority view holder's
perspective. For example, a Republican in California will go to the polls knowing his vote is a
drop in the bucket, and that it could and would mean more in a different state. All while voters in
the swing states such as Ohio and Florida will tip the scales ofan election based on the lact that
27 Califomia has become a reliably Democratic state today, winning the past seven presidential
elections. 2016 marked the third consecutive election that the Democratic nominee has surpassed
607o in the state.
2s Indiana has been a reliably Republican State for decades. Winning nine ofthe last ten
presidential elections. The loss was by 1% in 2012 to Barack Obama.
2s See Andrew Prokop, "Why the Electoral College is the Absolute Worst,
Explained", vox.com Nov. 10,2016
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their communities are more politically divided. But not only swing states get special privileges,
small states as well are afforded certain advantages.
Built into the Electoral College system at a fundamental level, is a small state bias. Every
state in the U.S. is guaranteed at least three electoral votes no matter their size. This means that
in the 2016 election four percent ofthe country's population that represent the smallest states,
were actually alloued eight percent ofthe Electoral College's votes3l. In the 1996 election
between President Bill Clinton and Bob Dole, Wyoming cast roughly 210,000 votes total, thus
each oftheir three electoral votes represented about 70,000 votes. Meanwhile, in Califomia
approximately 9,700 votes were cast for 54 electoral votes, therefore representing about 170,000
voters3l. That is a great disparity that clearly creates an unfair advantage for smaller states over
larger ones.
Finally, the will of the American people is not being represented to its fullest capacities.
With over 300 million people in our country and growing, it seems ancient to adhere to a system
in which 538 people will select the next president. What makes it more difficult to bear is that
debatably, the Electoral College is going directly against the will ofthe American people.
In 1824, Andrew Jackson won the popular vote yet received less than halfofthe electoral
votes. In 1876, Samuel Tilden won the popular vote, but lost the election by one Electoral
College vote. In 1888, Grover Cleveland also won the popular vote, but lost by 55 votes in the
Electoral College32. To this point, all ofthe examples have been from over a century ago, but the
30 See Andrew Prokop, "Why the Electoral College is the Absolute Worst,
Explained", vox.com Nov. 10,2016
3l See: Marc Schulman, "Why The Electoral College" historycentral.com
32 See: Rachael Revesz, "Five presidential nominees who won popular vote but lost the
election" independent.co.uk Nov. 1 6, 201 6
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two most recent examples tend to show that this is a problem that is getting worse in the U.S.
First, in the year 2000, Al Gore won over half a million more votes than President George W.
Bush. Despite that fact, President Bush gained 271 electoral votes, compared to Mr. Gore's 255
votes. Even more shocking were the results ofthe 2016 election33. According to the Cook
Political Report, Hillary Clinton's final vote total was 65,844,610 compared to Donald Trump's
63,979,636,leaving a differerce of 2,864,974 votes in Clinton's favola. Despite this, Trump
won the electoral college by a wide margin, 304 lo 227 . Donald Trump lost the popular election
by a larger margin than any other U.S. president in history. "That deficit is more than five times
bigger than the 544,000 by which George W. Bush lost to Al Gore in 2000 - the second biggest
popular vote deficit in history for a candidate who has still gone on to become president"
(Kentish 2016). This unnatural result was the culmination of Trump winning several larger states
such as Florida, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, by very thin margins. Meanwhile, Clinton
claiming victory by a wider margin in other larger states such as Califomia, Illinois, and New
York, did not help her cause3s. She fell victim to the Electoral College system. According to the
Pew Research Center, when looking back at all presidential elections since 1 828, the winner's
electoral vote share has on average, been 1.36 times his popular vote share. President Obama lor
example had an inflation factor of 1.21 in 2012, while President Trump canied a 1.22 inflation
factor in 2016. With the technological, societal, and word wide advancements since the time of
33 See: Benjamin Kentish "Donald Trump has lost popular vote by greater margin than any US
President" independent.co.uk Dec. 12, 2016
3a See: Sarah Begley "Hillary Clinton Leads by 2.8 Million in Final Popular Vote
Count", time.com Dec. 20, 201 6
3s See: Drew Desilver "Trump's victory another example of how Electoral College wins are
bigger than popular vote ones", pgrqgsgalqh.olg Dec. 20,2016
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Alexander Hamilton, it is hard to say that this would be the way he envisioned the Electoral
College working. In fact, this is not the only way in which the Electoral College can work. The
Electoral College can adapt into a more adequate tool lor elections if Americans so choose36.
Over 700 proposals have been brought before Congress to make a change in the Electoral
College. But there are two main ways in which the system could change. The first is a
constitutional amendment, and the second would be actions that comes from the state. To begin,
a constitutional amendment would be very difficult, ifnot impossible to gather in a hyper
political and highly partisan time such as now. Requiring3l4 of the states to approve ol anything,
very much seems to be a herculean task at this point in time. That is why the best altemative
solution to the issues with the Electoral College, is a solution at the state level. On the state level
there are two different methods that could potentially change the problems built into the electoral
college system. First, a simple fix that could do the most good for the most people would be to
change the Electoral College and stop selecting Electors on a winner take all basis. Currently all
but two states use a plwality winner take all system to pick their presidential electors. Cunently
Maine and Nebraska award part oftheir electoral votes by congressional district rather than
statewide. This leads to results such as President Trump taking one of Maine's four electoral
votes, even though Hillary Clinton won the state overall3T. The main issue with doing a system
like this nationwide, is the state mutml assent. This would require all states to agree to make this
change at the same time in order for it to work. Because any specitic action from a state would in
36 See: Marc Schulman "Changing The Electoral College", historycentral.com
37 See: Drew Desilver "Trump's victory another example of how Electoral College wins are
bigger than popular vote ones", pg1y19ggg1q!4gg Dec. 20,2016
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effect either help or significantly hurt one side, it is only possible to do it simultaneously. Next,
the most viable proposal at this current time, seems to be just as simple.
The Electoral College Pact is a plan to get states to direct their electors to vote for
whoever wins the popular vote. Ten states in addition to the District of Columbia have already
debated and passed legislation to this avail. Cunently, states that have signed the pact have a
total of 165 electoral votes between them. Ifand when that number represents the 270 electoral
votes needed to win an election, then the Electoral College Pacr will automatically take full
effect. Up to this point, only states that lean Democratic have signed on to the pledge. This is
most likely because the effects of the Electoral College have yet to negatively affect the
Republican party in recent history. It likely witl take an election where a Republican wins the
popular vote and not the electoral vote in order to light a fire under the party. While this plan
may not be completed tomorrow, or next year, it is a viable option for the future, and that is hard
to say on behalfofthe Electoral College currently.
62 percent of Americans would forgo the Electoral College in favor ofa "one person, one
vote" election process (Saad 2011). The Electoral College that was ratified as a part ofthe
Constitution at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, is today, flawed. Throughout time, and
through authoritative bodies ofleadership such as the Constitution, U.S. legislative history, and
the Supreme Court, we see the Electoral College as we know it. It has been shaped over time to
conform to political parties' interests, rather than the nations. The American people have not
only spoken in a survey about their dislike for the Electoral College, they also did it at the voting
booth. Two ofthe last three Presidents of the United States did not win as many votes as the
individual they ran against. That is a direct result olindividual voters in the country having their
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votes weighted differently than others. This law specifically gives privileges to some in small
states, while stripping those in large states ofthe power of their votes. That is unjust.
H.L.A. Hart distinguished three types of secondary rules that mark a societal change from
primitive forms of law to a true legal system38. The second of which, was the rule of change
which enables a society to add, remove, and modify valid rules. A true legal system can and will
allow a society to change valid rules. That must be the argument in this case. The Electoral
College is a valid law. From a positivist's perspective, with the great deal of authority and social
construct behind it, it is close to impossible to argue any other point. Butjust because a law is
legally valid, we know that does not mean it is morally valid. The moral property of law, rest on
its medts3e, but today, there seems to be little merit in a winner take all system.
Natural Law and Natural Rights
In John Finnis' seminal work Natural Law and Natural Rights. he provides an
interpretation of basic human goods, and his basic requirements of practical reasonableness.
Natural Law according to Finnis has no history because it is etemal and unchanging. He goes on
to lay out his exhaustive theory ofthe good and contends that there are seven self-evident or
obvious human goods. Finnis goes on to explain that these goods are ofequal imporlance and are
fundamentally different, meaning there is no way to arbitrarily rank the order of the goods. He
contends that all must respect and participate in these seven basic goods in order to obtain a full
flourishing life. The pursuit ofthese basic goods leads to everything one could want to have,
38 See H.L.A. Hafi, (1994, first edition 1961) The Concept of Law, 2nd, ed. ed.p. Bullock
3e See: Hans Kelsen (1945). "General Theory of Law and State", trans. A. Wedberg. repr. 1961 .
New York: Russell and Russell.
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want to do, or want to be. Therefore, when enacting and maintain legal systems, one must look to
understand how their laws value and emphasis these seven basic goods.
John Finnis answers the question What constitutes a worthu,hile, valuable life? He
answers said question with his seven basic goods. The first basic good or value that Finnis
references is the value of lifea0. This value corresponds to the drive for self'-preservation. It
includes bodily health, procreation, and as of a 201 1 postscript, marriage between a man and a
woman. Finnis speaks much more in depth about his second basic good, which is the pursuit of
knowledge.
Knowledge is a good in the intrinsic sense; it is valuable lor its own sake and not simply
as a means or instrument to obtain other goods. Thus, according to Finnis, knowledge is
distinguished from belief. Beliefs can be true or false, but knowledge ofthe truth cannot, it is in
itself, an achievement4l. The good in knowledge is not about knowing specilics, for example.
knowing the weather for the next month. Rather, the value in knowledge is simply in the pursuit
and commitment involved in obtaining the knowledge.
The third basic aspect of human well-being for Finnis is play. (Finnis p. 86). According
to him, play has its own value. The way one accomplishes the act of playing does not mattera2.
Be it individually or socially, intellectually or physically, or highly structured or inlormally, the
ao 
"The term'life' here signifies every aspect ofthe vitality (rila. life) which puts a human being
in good shape for self-determination. Hence, life here includes bodily (including cerebral health,
and freedom from the pain that betokens organic malfunctioning or injury." (Finnis p.86)
ol 
"To think of knowledge as a value is not, as such, to think of it as a'mora[' value; 'truth is a
good' is not, here, to be understood as a moral proposition, and 'knowledge is to be pursued' is
not understood, here, as stating a moral obligation, requirement, prescription, or
recommendation." (Finnis p. 62)
4'z 
"More importantly, each one of us can see the point of engaging in performances which have
no point beyond the performance itsetf'. (Finnis p. 87)
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way in which one plays does not matter. As long as individuals do not lail to observe this
redoubtable and irreplaceable element ofhuman culture.
Finnis's fourth basic good is aesthetic experience. While some of the examples of
aesthetic experiences overlap with play, such a song or dance, Finnis explains that beauty cannot
be described as an indispensable element ofplay. "Aesthetic experience, unlike play, need not
involve an action ofone's own; what is sought after and valued for its own sake may simply be
the beautiful form 'outside' one, and the 'inner' experience ofappreciation of its beauty"'(Finnis
p. 88). Often enough, the value that an aesthetic experience offers is found not in the action
specifically, but value is found in the creation, and active appreciation ofbeauty.
The fifth basic good according to Finnis is sociability or friendship. He goes on to state
that sociability "in its weakest form is realized by a minimum of peace and harmony amongst
persons, and which ranges through the forms of human community to its strongest fbrm in the
flowering of full friendships" id 89. Sociability may hold together society and be tremendously
important in its own right, but Finnis points out the importance of lriendship a1 a personal level
as wella3. Friendship involves acting not for yourself, but in the best interests olanother. It is
imperative that individuals everywhere as a basic value and good, hold at least one such
relationship categorized purely as a friendship.
Whereas Finnis speaks about this basic good seventh. I will speak about it sixth. I'hat
basic good is religion. In a broad sense, Finnis was referencing our human concem about the
order oflife. Not necessarily a 'religion' per se, rather a sense ofwonder and exploration of the
a3 
"Friendship involves acting for the sake ofone's friend's purposes, one's friend's well-being.
To be in a relationship of friendship with at least one other person is a fundamental form of
good, is it not?" (Finnis p. 88)
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meaning ofexistenceaa. Finnis references the concem about an order ofthings beyond the reach
ofeach and every one ofus, and questions ifthose concems realty fall into the category of
religion. Therefore, the basic good that comes from religion can be categorized as the connection
with, and participation in, the orders that transcend individual humanity45.
Finally, the last of the basic goods is Practical Reason. In order to participate in this good,
one must make rational decisions that maximize one's participation in the other six goods. By
choosing worth-while activities to pursue, by making morally conscience decisions, and by
fulfilling the nine sub-requirements ofPractical Reason that Finnis lays out, one can participate
in this very important, self-evident basic good.
"For amongst the basic forms ofgood that we have no good reason to leave out of
account is the good ofpractical reasonableness, which is participated in precisely by shaping
one's participation in the other basic goods, by guiding one's commitments. one's selection of
projects, and what one does in carrying them out" (Finnis p. 100). The nine requirements of
Practical Reason are self-evident in the same way that the basic goods are self-evident. They are
the means through which one participates in the basic goods. Therefore, it is imperative that one
looks to these nine principles when making decisions for oneself, or conversely, for society as a
whole.
aa 
"But is it reasonable to deny that it is, at any rate, peculiarly important to have thought
reasonably and (where possible) correctly about these questions of the origins of cosmic order
and ofhuman freedom and reason 
- 
whatever the answer to those questions tums out to be, even
if the answer to those questions tums out to be, and even ifthe answers have to be agnostic or
negative?" (Finnis p. 89)
4s 
"Ifthere is a transcendent origin of the universal order-of-things and olhuman freedom and
reason, then one's life and actions are in fundamental disorder ifthey are not brought, as best one
can, into some sort of harmony ..." (Finnis p. 90)
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The first principle ofpractical reason is to have a coherent plan of life. "Implicitly or
explicitly one must have a harmonious set ofpurposes and orientations, not as the 'plans' or
'blueprints' of a pipe-dream, but as effective commitments." (Finnis p. 104). Essentially. Finnis
explains that it is important to view your life as a whole. Do not live moment to moment acting
on instinct or impulses, rather live intelligently and control urges and imputses (rdJ
The next principle of practical reason is to hold no arbitrary preferences amongst
values46. Finnis understands clearly that it is natural to priorities certain goods over others, for
example an academic prioritizing knowledge higher than play. Finnis's point here is that these
decisions cannot be made arbitrarily. Accordingly, it is unreasonable to devalue any ofthe basic
forms of human excellence, it is also unreasonable to overvalue any such merely derivative
instrumental goods, such as wealth or one's reputation. "lt is one thing to have little capacity and
even no 'taste' for scholarship, or friendship, or physical heroism. or sanctity: it is quite another
thing, and stupid or arbitrary, to think or speak or act as ifthese were not real lorms ofgood"
(Finnisp. 105).
The third requirement of practical reasonableness is no arbitrary preferences amongst
persons. Basic goods apply equally to all people. There is a legitimate scope for self-preference,
but it does notjusti! egoism. To the extent that one puts themselves in the best position for self-
preference, that is fine, but they should always take into account the good ofothers.
The fourth and fifth requirements ofpractical reasonableness go hand in hand with each
other. The fourth being detachment and the fifth being commitment. As it goes lor detachment,
a6 
"Any commitment to a coherent plan of life is going to involve some degree of concentration
on one or some of the basic forms ofgood, at the expense, temporarily or permanently. ofother
forms of good... But the commitment will be rational only if it is on the basis of one's
assessment ofone's capacities, circumstances, and even ofone's tastes" (Finnis p. 105).
Finnis believes that one should avoid over concentration on one value or the fanatical pursuit ofa
good. "There are often straightforward and evil consequences of succumbing to the temptation to
give one's particular project the overriding and unconditional significance which only a basic
value can claim...they are the evil consequences that we call to mind when we think of
fanaticism" (Finnis p. 110). As for commitments, Finnis believes that one should not abandon
them lightly. Rather they should look for a new and more creative way to promote the good. This
creativity according to Finnis shows that a person ofa society is truly living on the level of
practical principle, and not merely on the level of conventional rules ofconduct. In effect, the
fourth and fifth requirements ofpractical reasonableness are counter-balancing. They establish
the balance between fanaticism and dropping out, and when utilized correctly are part ofa
blueprint ofa practically reasonable life.
The sixth requirement for practical reasonableness is the limited relevance of
consequences or efficiency within reasonlT. In essence, one should calculate and plan their
actions so that they are the most efficient and do the most good. Finnis points out that
consequentialist calculus ofthe greatest good for the greatest number is senseless and irrational.
That is because it is based on an inadequate idea ofthe good, it assumes goods are
commensurable, and it weighs the possible consequences ofan act going on endlessly with
predictions ofthe future, which is not possible (Finnis p. I l2).
Respect for every basic value in every act is the seventh requirement for practical
reasonableness. Accordingly, one should never commit an act that directly harms a basic good,
even if it will indirectly benefit a different basic good. For example, one should not kill even if it
47 
"For this is the requirement that one bring about good in the world (in one's oun life and the
lives of others) by actions that are effrcient for their (reasonable) purpose(s)" (Finnis p. 1 I I ).
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will indirectly save more lives later. When choosing one good it will result in the subordination
ofothers. Therefore, Finnis noted that it is important for one to distinguish between direct and
indirect actions and justifiable side-atfects.
The eighth requirement for practical reasonableness is to fbster and favor the common
good oflhe communities one is a part of. The sense and implications of this requirement are
complex and manifold, as well as overarching. When Finnis say communities, that could mean
family, friends, work, neighbors, town. state, country, and all the way up to an intemational-
communities. Thus, because communities are so involved in every day basic human life, "Very
many, perhaps even most, ofour concrete moral responsibilities. obligations, and duties have
their basis in the eighth requirement" (Finnis p. 125).
The ninth and final requirement for practical reasonableness is straightforward, and that
is to follow one's conscience. One should act according to their conscience and practical reason,
not the authority of someone elsea8. This is not just a mechanism for producing correct
judgements, but an aspect ofpersonal full-being.
When one is able to adapt Finnis's theory ofthe goods as well as his requirements for
practical reasonableness, it becomes strong tool decision making tool. The morality of diflcult
decision can and should be played out through these mechanisms. Therefore, looking at the
Electoral College through the eyes ofFinnis's work will offer a better understanding of morality
and it will specifu the overarching structure and goals ofa good and reasonable society.
* 
"This dignity ofeven the mistaken conscience is what is expressed in the ninth requirement. It
flows from the fact that practical reasonableness is not simply a mechanism for producing correct
judgements, but an aspect of personal full-being, to be respected (like all the other aspects) in
every act as well as 'over-all' 
- 
whatever the consequences (Finnis p. 126).
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As stated earlier, Finnis's seven good and nine requirements ofpractical reasonableness
apply equally to allae. Therefore, to make rational decisions in life one must think reasonably and
in accordance with the nine requirements to most effectively participate in the basic goods. The
system created by Finnis is clearly flexible. In making day to day decisions one can chose to go
for a run, to go to a party, orjust to stay home and read, all of which in principle, are legitimare
choices. Obviously not all choices are reasonably justifiable, such spending ofan entire day
doing nothing. There are also choices that are plain wrong such as murder.
Although some acts are \,!rong, there is no single correct act, and that is because the seven
good are equally fundamental. Therefore, in practical reason, there can be two contradictory acts
that are both morally conect choices. It is up to the members ofsociety, and their free will to
choose which act they will adopt. The Electoral College seems to fit perfectly into this example
of a morally justifiable choice, even ifthere is an equally or more justifiable contradictory act.
Some law can directly serve basic goods, such as law against murder. Most law on the
other hand is not that direct. Conversely, laws such as the Electoral College are created to
stabilize society in which people have the freedom and ability to choose how to purse the basic
goods. Just as any individual has the right to go for a run, or go to a party, the creators of law are
free to choose the manner in which the system works. If the legal system is in service to the basic
goods in accordance with practical reason, it can be said to be a morally good legal system.
Ifone accepts a legal system, as it is clear that most do in America. then they have a legal
obligation to obey the law. Essentially, Finnis's argument goes as tbllows. one ought to pursue
4e 
"Thus, I have illustrated this point in relation to life, truth, and play; the reader can easily test
and confirm it in relation to each ofthe other basic values. Each is fundamental. None is more
fundamental than any others, for each can reasonably be focused upon, and each, when focused
upon, claims a priority ofvalue. Hence there is no objective priority ofvalue amongst them"
(Finnis p. 93).
30
the basic good, society must coordinate in order to achieve the basic goods, the law is effective
in coordinating society in this manner, and therefore one ought to obey the law (Finnis p. 31 5)s0.
This means that individuals hold both a legal and moral obligation to respect and obey law.
Conclusion
"The tradition goes so far as to say that there may be an obligation to conform to some
such laws in order to uphold respect for the legal system as a w.hole" (Finnis p. 352). The
Electoral College is not perfect, I don't believe there is anyone arguing that. But systematic
validity is immensely important. The Electoral College is a valid law. From a positivist's
perspective, with the great deal ol authority and social construct behind it, it is close to
impossible to argue any other point. But just because a law is legally valid, we know that does
not mean it is morally valid. The moral property of law. rest on its meritsle.
When looking into the merits of the Electoral College from John Finnis's moral
perspective, it seems clear to me that the Elector College is a morally valid law. The Electoral
College is in service to the basic goods in accordance with practical reason, therefore it can be
said to be a morally good law. When Alexander Hamilton wrote The Federalist Papers #68 in
1788, he had not Finnis's nine principles ofpractical reason or seven basic goods in mind. But he
did nothing to directly contradict these seven goods, and nothing to overvalue any ofsuch goods.
50 
"The answer to the problem consists in the correct identification olthe law-abiding subject's
practical reasoning- reasoning to which such a norm is directed and which such a norm is
intended to direct in a distinctively 'obligatory' way. (Finnis p. 3 15).
3e See: Hans Kelsen ( 1945). "General Theory of Law and State", trans. A. Wedberg, repr. I 961 .
New York: Russell and Russell.
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Our founders did use practical reasonableness to decide what is best for our country and how to
implement such systems.
Finnis's seven basic goods serve as an explanation ofwhy we do things. All activities
worth doing participate in one or more basic goods. As such, it is clear that the Electoral College
not only participates in one basic good but many. From knowledge, to sociability, and to
practical reasonableness, it is clear that The Electoral College promotes multiple basic goods and
does not contradict any of the nine requirements ofpractical reason.
When I began writing this paper, I was under the assumption that I would conclude The
Electoral College to be either legally invalid, morally invalid, or both. The system seemed unfair,
unjust, and easily changeable. But by using Finnis's logic, it is become clear that The Electoral
College is neither legally or morally invalid. There may be better and more lair ways in which
Americans can vote in Presidential elections, such as the Electoral College Pact spoken about
earlier. But in practical reason, there can be two contradictory acts that are both morally
permissible choices. It is up to human free will to choose which act they will adopt. That is what
happened with The Electoral College.
The Electoral College was the great compromise that our lounders needed to bring us a
more perfect union. Truly, this was the genius ofJohn Finnis. He laid out requirements that
specified an overarching structure and goals. But Finnis's system does not mandate events in
either small day to day life, or massive decisions like choosing to establish The Electoral
College. It is up to human free will, paired with the ideals and values ofpractical reasonableness
to carry out those acts. As long as the Electoral College continues to be of service to the basic
goods and in accordance with practical reason, it is a morally good legal system. In conclusion,
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based on John Finnis's seven basic good and his principles ofpractical reasonableness, The
Electoral College is both legally and morally valid in The United States of America.
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